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In a recent paper Ganguli and Yang [2009] demonstrate, that there can ex-
ist multiple equilibria in a ﬁnancial market model á la Grossman and Stiglitz
[1980] if traders possess private information regarding the supply of the risky
asset. The additional equilibria differ in some important respects from the usual
equilibrium of the Grossman–Stiglitz type which still exists in this model. This
note shows that these additional equilibria are always unstable under learn-
ing. This is true for both eductive learning following Guesnerie [2002] and
adaptive learning via least–squares estimation (cf. Marcet and Sargent [1988]
or Evans and Honkapohja [2001]). Regarding the original Grossman–Stiglitz
type equilibrium, the stability results are less clear cut, since this equilibrium
might be unstable under eductive learning while it is always stable under adap-
tive learning.
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lueneburg.de.1 Introduction
In a recent paper Ganguli and Yang [2009] demonstrate, that there can exist mul-
tiple equilibria in a ﬁnancial market model á la Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] if
traders possess private information regarding the supply of the risky asset. The
informational properties of the additonal equilibria differ from the usual Grossman–
Stiglitz like equilibrium which still exists in this model.
As usual in case of multiple equilibria, the question arises whether or not
there exists a plausible selection device which implies that traders indeed coordi-
nate on these additional equilibria. One important selection device asks whether
or not a speciﬁc equilibrium is stable under learning. Discussing this brieﬂy,
Ganguli and Yang [2009] note that the static setup of their model doesn’t allow
for such an analysis as learning processes are inherently dynamic.
This note argues against this view. Not only do there exist concepts of learn-
ing that are applicable to static models. It is moreover possible to put the model
of Ganguli and Yang [2009] into a framework which makes it possible to analyse
real-time adaptive learning processes. Using the concepts of ’eductive learning’ trac-
ing back to Guesnerie [2002] and adaptive learning via least–squares estimation
following Marcet and Sargent [1988] or Evans and Honkapohja [2001] it is shown
that the additional equilibria described by Ganguli and Yang [2009] are always un-
stable under learning. Thus, using stability under learning as a selection device, we
should disregard these additional equilibria, because its unlikely that traders will
coordinate on them. Regarding the original Grossman–Stiglitz type equilibrium,
we get no clear cut stability results, since this equilibrium might be unstable under
eductive learning while it is always stable under adaptive learning.
2 A ﬁnancial market model with supply information
There is a continuum of traders i ∈ I = [0,1] and each trader is endowed with ¯ x units
of the riskless asset and ¯ z(i) units of a risky asset. The riskless asset yields 1 unit, the
risky asset b units of a single consumption good, where b is unknown and drawn
from a normal distribution with mean ¯ b and precision t. Traders possess private
information regarding the return of the risky asset, but since aggregate supply of
the stock is stochastic too, the REE price of the asset will not be fully revealing.
Each trader observes a private signal s(i) = b+u(i) that informs about b. Here
u(i) is for all i an independent and normally distributed random variable with zero
mean and precision tu. The endowment of a trader with the risky asset is given by
¯ z(i) = ¯ z+e+h(i), where h(i) is an idiosyncratic shock, which is normally distributed
with zero mean and precision th. The common shock e to the aggregate supply of
the stock is also normally distributed with zero mean and precision te. Using the
riskless asset as numeraire and with p denoting the price of the risky asset as well
1as zi denoting the demand of the risky asset of trader i, his ﬁnal wealth W1,i is:
W(i) = ¯ x+ p¯ z(i)+z(i)[b− p]
Each trader maximizes the expected utility of his ﬁnal wealthW(i), where the utility
function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion 0 < g < ¥ for all i ∈ I. A trader’s
asset demand z(i) in this model is conditioned on his private signal s(i) regarding the
asset return, his information regarding the aggregate supply of the stock contained




g Var[b|s(i),p, ¯ z(i)]
￿
E[b|s(i),p, ¯ z(i)]− p
￿
From the assumptions made above it then follows that the rational expectations




4 then there exist two rational expectations equilibria in which
asset demand z∗(i) of trader i observing the signal s(i), his endowment ¯ z(i) and the








































Proof. See Proposition 1 of Ganguli and Yang [2009]. ￿




























As (1b) reveals, d∗
1 is unique across these equilibria, while d∗
0 and d∗















In what follows, the analysis of learning processes, either eductive or adaptive, will
be conducted with the help of the so called T–map. This T–map describes how pa-
rameters of a linear decision rule followed by the agents change with the passage of
2(virtual or real ) time due to learning. This T–map is extensively used in the anal-
ysis of adaptive learning processes following the approaches of Marcet and Sargent
[1988] and Evans and Honkapohja [2001]. In the present context, this T–map turns
out to coincide with the best response mapping deﬁned in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 If asset demand z(i) of all traders i is linear in s(i), p and ¯ z(i) and given
by z(i) = d0+d1s(i)+d2 p+d3 ¯ z(i), the best response of any trader j ∈ I is also a linear




3 ¯ z(j), where
d′
0 =
















Proof. See Appendix. ￿
With d′ = (d′
0 ...,d′
3)′ and d = (d0,...,d3)′ equations (3a)–(3d) give rise to the so
called T-map which is central to the analysis of learning processes:
d′ = Td(d) (4)
Obviously, the above described REE DI and DII are ﬁxed points of this T–map.
2.2 Eductive learning
The concept of a strongly rational expectations equilibrium (SREE) asks, whether a
speciﬁc REE can be ’educed’ by agents assuming nothing more than individual ra-
tionality and common knowledge.1 The idea is that agents will not follow strategies
that are not best responses to other agent’s strategies. Thus, in a way analogous to
the concept of a rationalizable Nash–equilibrium, non–best responses can be elimi-
nated from the agent’s strategy sets. A REE is eductively stable or a SREE, whenever
the REE is the unique outcome of this process. Guesnerie [2002] provides a com-
prehensive description of this concept and the reader is referred to this reference for
details.
Regarding the proof of eductive stability, the essential point is that this proof ob-
viously depends on the properties of the best response mapping. A REE is eductively
stable if and only if this REE turns out to be a locally stable stationary point of the
1The terms ’strongly rational expectations equilibrium’ and ’eductively stable equilibrium’ can be
used interchangeable.
3best response mapping. As this best response mapping coincides with the T–map,
eductive stability requires that all eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the T–map (4) eval-
uated at the speciﬁc REE are less than one in absolute value. Now, from (3a)–(3d)
and using (1b) we get that the eigenvalues l1,...,l4 of the T–map are given by:
l1 = 0, l2 =
tuth
(1−d∗













tuth . Together with (2a) we
then get that l2 is non negative and always greater than one in case of the DII–
REE and always smaller than one in case of the DI–REE. While this implies that the
DII–REE is never a SREE, it does not imply that the DI–REE is always eductively
stable. As (5) reveals, 0 < l2 < 1 doesn’t rule out that the remaining two eigenval-
ues l3 and l4 are smaller than −1. This simply repeats an already known result
(cf. Desgranges and Heinemann [2003], Heinemann [2004]) according to which
the unique REE of the original Grossman–Stiglitz model isn’t always a SREE.
The papers by Desgranges and Heinemann [2003] and Heinemann [2004] show
that REE with private information in which agents try to extract information from
current market prices are eductively stable if and only if the informational content
of the market price is less than the informational content of the private signals, the
agents receive. In the present context, this condition requires that:
Var[b|s(i)] < Var[b|p, ¯ z(i)]
Now, simple computations show that Var[b|s(i)] = 1
















Now, according to (1d) the DII–REE necessarily implies 1−2d∗
3 < 0 such that
condition (6) can never be satisﬁed for this equilibrium. On the other hand, the
DI–REE always implies 1−2d∗
3 > 0. Thus, it might well be that condition (6) is
satisﬁed in case of a DI–REE. This depends on the parameters tu, te, th and g. Figure
1 depicts a case, where the DI–REE is eductively stable. The ﬁgure also reveals that
a sufﬁcient condition for eductive stability of the Grossman–Stiglitz like DI–REE is
tu < th
3 Stability under adaptive learning
In order to analyze the stability of the two above described REE under adaptive
learning it is necessary to embed the hitherto static model into a dynamic framework













such it is at all possible to analyze real time learning processes. Thus, from now on
it is assumed that the just described static model is repeated over a long horizon.
In each period t, two ex ante unobserved random variables ¯ zt and bt realize and
traders observe their private signals s(i)t = bt +u(i)t as well as ¯ z(i)t = ¯ zt +et +h(i)t.
Individual asset demand depends on an estimator ˆ b(i)t of the unknown asset as well
as an estimator for its variance Var[ˆ b](i)t based on data available up to time t. At
the end of every period, agents then revise their estimates ˆ b(i) and Var[ˆ b](i) in the
light of new data, consisting of the endogenous variable pt and their private signals
s(i)t and ¯ z(i)t as well as the ex post observed realizations ¯ zt and bt. The recursive
estimation is done using recursive least squares.
Estimation of the equation
b = a0+a1s(i)+a2 p+a3 ¯ z(i),
by trader i using data up to time t then leads to an estimator ˆ b(i)t+1 for b given
by ˆ b(i)t+1 = y(i)′
t+1 ˆ a(i)t+1, where y(i)t = (1,s(i)t,pt,¯ z(i)t)′, a(i)t = (a(i)0,t,...,a(i)3,t)′
and


















An estimator ˆ v(i) for the variance results as








5Given these estimates, asset demand of trader i in period t is given by:
z(i)t =






ˆ a(i)0,t + ˆ a(i)1,t s(i)t +(ˆ a(i)2,t −1)pt + ˆ a(i)3,t ¯ z(i)t
￿
, (8)
Equation (8) is again linear in s(i), p and ¯ z(i) and the question now is, whether
adaptive learning implies that the coefﬁcients of this linear demand function con-
verge against their REE counterparts DI or DII. With respect to this, it turns out that
the asymptotic properties of the adaptive learning process are again characterized
by the properties of the above described T–map. Using the stochastic approximation
tools described by Evans and Honkapohja [2001], it can be shown (see Appendix
A.2 for details) that the asymptotic dynamics of the learning algorithm are governed











Thus, a REE of the model is stable under adaptive learning whenever the eigenvalues
of Jacobian of (Ta,Tv) evaluated at an REE are smaller than one (implying that the
eigenvalues of the map (9) are negative).
Now, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of (Ta(a,v),Tv(a,v)) evaluated at an REE
coincide with the respective eigenvaluesof the Jacobian of Td(d) (see again Appendix
A.2 for details). Therefore, as the above discussion of eductive stability revealed,
the DII–REE cannot be stable under adaptive learning as this equilibrium implies
that one eigenvalue (l2 from (5)) is greater than one. On the other hand, the above
described results imply that the DI–REE is always stable under adaptive learning.
4 Summary
The aim of the paper was to show that it is possible to analyze the properties of mul-
tiple equilibria existing in the ﬁnancial market model of Ganguli and Yang [2009]
under learning. This analysis revealed that the additional equilibria which arise in
their model due the existence of supply shocks are unstable under eductive as well
as adaptive learning. If ever, the original Grossman–Stiglitz type REE turns out to
be stable under learning as this equilibrium is always stable under adaptive learning
and potentially stable under eductive learning.
As the model analyzed in the present paper is one where private information is
exogenouslygiven, it remains to discuss, whether the endogenization of the decision
to acquire information can lead to any changes of the stability results. However, as
any decision of a trader to acquire information will be based on the expected bene-
ﬁts of private information acquisition, this decision will be based on the expectation
of a speciﬁc REE. Therefore, an REE which is unstable under learning with exoge-
nous information must be also unstable under learning when the decision to acquire
6information is endogenous. With respect to eductive learning, this is demonstrated
by Desgranges and Heinemann [2003] in a model similar to the ﬁnancial market
model of Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]. They show that that eductive stability with
exogenous information is a necessary condition for eductive stability with endoge-
nous acquisition of information as the latter leads to additional and possibly stronger
conditions for eductive stability.
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A Appendix
A.1 Best response mapping
Given z(i) = d0 +d1s(i) +d2 p+d3 ¯ z(i) for all i ∈ I, we have p =
(¯ z+e)(1−d3)−d0−d1b
d2 . With
y(j) = (s(j),p, ¯ z(j))′ and ¯ y = (¯ b, ¯ p,¯ z)′ it then follows:











Here Myy =E[y(j)y(j)′] and Mby =E[y(j)b] and the respective moments appearing in the ma-
trix Myy and vector Mby are functions of d0,...,d3. It then follows that optimal asset demand
z∗(j) =
E[b|p,s(j),¯ z(j)]−p
g Var[b|p,s(j),¯ z(j)] of a trader j is a linear function of s(j), p and ¯ z(j)) the coefﬁcients of
which depend on d0,...,d3 too. Computing the respective moments substituting these into
the asset demand function then gives the best response mapping.
7A.2 Asymptotic Properties of Least–Squares Learning
Using stochastic approximation tools described by Evans and Honkapohja [2001], it follows
that with respect to ˆ a(i) and ˆ v(i) the asymptotic dynamics of the learning process (7a)–(7c)
are governed by ordinary differential equations which in the present context are given as
follows:





























The moments appearing in the matrix Myy and the vector Mby are functions of the parameters
a0,...,a3 and v of the other traders’ demand functions. Thus, (A.10a) and (A.10b) deﬁne
two dynamic equations ˙ a(i) = Ta(a, v)−a(i) and ˙ v(i) =Tv(a, v)−v(i). Now, all traders learn
in an identical way from individual data which is drawn from identical distributions. Due to
this symmetry, we can drop the individual subscripts when studying the asymptotic behavior











A REE is a stable stationary point of this system, whenever the eigenvalues of the Ja-
cobian of (Ta,Tv) evaluated at the RRE are smaller than one. Computing the respective





















then reveals after some manipulation that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of (Ta,Tv) coincide
with the eigenvalues of Td
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